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INFORMATION SECURITY POLICIES: A CONTENT ANALYSIS 
Isabel Maria Lopes, Instituto Politécnico de Bragança, Portugal, isalopes@ipb.pt 
Filipe de Sá-Soares, University of Minho, Centre Algoritmi, Portugal, fss@dsi.uminho.pt 
Abstract 
Among information security controls, the literature gives a central role to information security 
policies. However, there is a reduced number of empirical studies about the features and components 
of information security policies. This research aims to contribute to fill this gap. It presents a synthesis 
of the literature on information security policies content and it characterizes 25 City Councils 
information security policy documents in terms of features and components. The content analysis 
research technique was employed to characterize the information security policies. The profile of the 
policies is presented and discussed and propositions for future work are suggested. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
With the advent of information technology (IT) and the massive use of the Internet and its services, the 
number of threats to which information is subject is increasingly higher and, consequently, the need to 
protect information systems (IS) is becoming imperious. The coordinated set of efforts to protect 
information system’s assets is commonly referred to as information security management activity. 
In order to protect information, an organization implements a set of measures, also known as security 
controls, countermeasures, or safeguards, which can take many forms, such as policies, procedures, 
guidelines, practices, and organizational structures (ISO/IEC 2009). 
Among the controls that an organization may choose to implement, the literature highlights the central 
role of the information security policy (ISP). From a technical perspective, in a view close to the 
computer security school of thought (Baskerville and Siponen 2002), a security policy can be 
understood as “the set of rules that are used by the system to manage the access by subjects to objects 
in the system” (Bosch et al. 1993, p. 176). From a less technical perspective, in a view close to the 
security management school of thought (Baskerville and Siponen 2002), a security policy can be 
conceived as “a high-level statement of organizational beliefs, goals, and objectives, and the general 
means for their attainment as related to the protection of organizational assets” (Peltier 2002, p. 22). 
Regardless of how information security policies (hereafter ISPs) are conceptualized, there is a broad 
consensus in the literature as to their importance for the protection of information as well as systems 
and entities who manipulate it. There are even authors who point out the ISP as the foundation of 
information security, such as Higgins (1999, p. 217), who argues that “The security policy is to the 
security environment like the law is to a legal system. (…) A policy is the start of security 
management.”; Schneier (2000, p. 308), by noting that “a digital system without a security policy is 
likely to have a hodge-podge of countermeasures. The policy is what ties everything together.”; King 
et al. (2001, p. 13), when they observe that “An effective information security policy is as necessary to 
a good information security program as a solid foundation is to a house.”; Höne and Eloff (2002a, p. 
409), when they state that “The information security policy is one of the most important documents in 
an organization...”, and Shorten (2004, p. 917), by arguing that “the security policy is the foundation 
on which all security is based.” 
Given the centrality of ISPs, it is not surprising that the literature contains several contributions that 
aim to help organizations formulate, implement and review security policies. In addition to 
recommendations on the process of creating and implementing security policies, the literature includes 
studies whose authors discuss factors that enable the successful employment of security policies, as 
well as various guidelines on the content these documents should present. 
Despite the significant number of studies on the topic of ISPs, until mid-2000s the literature revealed a 
limited number of empirical studies on this security measure. Indeed, some authors had pointed to 
limitations on the research performed, such as the inexistence of a coherent theory about information 
security policies (Hong et al. 2003) and the inexistence or low expression of empirical studies focusing 
on the adoption, content and implementation of information security policies (Fulford and Doherty 
2003, Knapp et al. 2006). Since the time when these observations were made, several studies have 
arisen on ISPs of empirical nature, such as Karyda et al. (2005) and a significant group of studies 
focusing on employee compliance with ISPs, among which are Boss et al. (2009), Bulgurcu et al. 
(2010), Herath and Rao (2009), Johnston and Warkentin (2010), Myyry et al. (2009), Siponen and 
Vance (2010), and Warkentin et al. (2011). The majority of the works in this last set of studies 
promoted surveys that addressed the intentions and behaviors of employees, examining factors which 
facilitate or inhibit compliance with ISPs. These works, however, did not consider the specific ISPs 
documents held by organizations nor the connection between the wording in those documents and 
employees’ behaviors or intentions to protect information systems assets. 
 
We argue that IS security literature may be enriched by inquiring on what organizations do in terms of 
ISPs, the reasons for their choices, the difficulties they face during their formulation and 
implementation and on how they eventually overcome those difficulties. Armed with empirical data on 
the use of ISPs by organizations, we may be able to make better recommendations for practice, to 
check if there is a gap between what the literature advocates and what organizations actually 
materialize and to reason about the relationship between ISPs documents and user compliance. 
This work seeks to contribute to that purpose. Since it is not feasible, nor even conceivable, to address 
the whole thematic spectrum of ISPs, we decided to focus the work on the content of policies. The aim 
of the study is to characterize the documents that have been formally adopted by organizations as 
ISPs, centering the analysis on their content. 
The paper is structured as follows. After this introduction, we review the literature on the content of 
ISPs. Then, the research questions are presented and the research strategy is described. Afterwards, we 
present the main results of the study and discuss them. The paper ends by drawing conclusions and 
suggesting future work. 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
A policy can be understood as a “guideline or a set of directives which rule a person or an entity’s 
action” (ACL 2001, p. 2897). The nature of the policies as guidelines developed in the present to 
delimit future actions is stressed by Gilbert (2003, p. 3), noting that policies are “the chosen rules and 
procedures which will dictate future actions.” 
Generally, policies are embodied in written documents. The formalization of policies is recognized by 
Guel (2007, p. 3), who conceives a policy as “a formal, brief, and high-level statement or plan that 
embraces an organization’s goals, objectives, and acceptable procedures for a specific subject area.” 
A literature review on information security policies enabled the identification of three fundamental 
classes of meaning attached to this security control. 
The first class expresses a highly technical nature, where policies are viewed as tools for defining the 
technical security requirements that a given product or system should comply with (e.g., access control 
rules to IS resources). This is the case of the previous definition provided by Bosch et al. (1993) or the 
understanding of Pfleeger (1997, p. 271), to whom a policy is a “statement of the security we expect 
the system to enforce. An operating system (or any other piece of trusted system) can be trusted only 
in relation to a security policy, that is, to the security needs the system is expected to satisfy.” 
The second class points to the strategic nature of information security in organizations, where policies 
are conceived as documents that encapsulate information security management decisions, particularly 
in what concerns the objectives that guide the efforts to protect IS. This is the case of the previous 
definition provided by Peltier (2002) or the understanding of Karyda et al. (2003, p. 147), who 
consider a security policy “to be a high-level statement of the goals and objectives with regard to 
security, as well as the description of the general means for their attainment.” 
The third class of meaning conveys a behavioral nature, where policies are defined as guidelines or 
guides for action by organizational actors in the domain of information security. As illustrations of this 
class of meaning we have the understanding advanced by King et al. (2001, p. 304) to whom an 
“organization’s security policy, in essence, defines the details of what is permitted and what is denied 
within that organization’s computer systems and networks” and Bulgurcu et al. (2010, p. 526) view 
that an ISP is “a statement of the roles and responsibilities of the employees to safeguard the 
information and technology resources of their organizations.” 
Condensing these three classes of meaning, in this study we define ISPs as documents that guide or 
regulate people or systems’ actions in the domain of information security (de Sá-Soares 2005). 
 
Having clarified our understanding of ISP, and given the focus of this study, next we review the 
literature on information security policies content, organizing the contributions into two groups: 
features of policies and components of policies. 
2.1 Features of Information Security Policies 
The features of an ISP are the set of characteristics that the policy document presents. The literature 
review identified regularities among the works of several researchers with regard to the features an 
ISP should possess. Among the features that gather more consensus are its short length, accuracy and 
clarity, ease of understanding, high level of abstraction, durability and independence from the 
technology and specific security controls (Barman 2001; Hone and Eloff 2002b; Palmer et al. 2001; 
Peltier 2002; Pipkin 2000). 
The length of a policy depends on the amount and complexity of the systems and agents that it covers, 
as well as the level of abstraction applied in its writing, since a document with a high level of 
abstraction will not come into extensive detail. Höne and Eloff (2002a) recommend a length ranging 
between one and five pages. 
The way policies are written is another preponderant factor considered in the literature, which 
reinforces the need for the text to be accurate, clear and easily understood. All these formal features of 
policies suggest the concern that researchers place on the need of the recipients of these documents to 
assimilate them quickly, completely, and unambiguously. This concern is demonstrated by Simms 
(2009), by arguing that policy formulation must produce documents that are clear, simple and focused 
on the target audience and that they should include definitions of technical terms used in them, to 
minimize inconsistencies in their interpretation and to prevent that users do not comply with policy 
determinations due to a lack of understanding of the documents. This need to write policies in plain 
language and easy to understand had already been highlighted by Kee (2001), who advanced the 
SMART rule (acronym for Specific, Measurable, Agreeable, Realistic and Time-bound) as a guide for 
writing these documents. 
The durability of policy documents points to the need to revise the wording in the policy at regular 
intervals. This implies that these documents should have an expected duration, after which they should 
be subject to assessment in order to determine their adequacy and timeliness. This feature enables that 
changes in IT or business are taken into account, as well as eventual inadequacies of policies’ 
provisions to the context for which they were originally conceived. While policies may consist of 
provisional documents, they should not be found in a continuous review process, since it is expected 
that these documents show a minimum stability over time. This stability of policies will depend, in 
part, on not being too dependent upon specific IT, which could happen if they included references or 
assumptions about the more technical aspects related to the implementation of security mechanisms, as 
these may vary over time (Hone and Eloff 2002b). 
An additional feature of the policies is how they are structured, with different authors recognizing 
different forms of structuring. Lindup (1995) acknowledges the existence of organizational policies, 
which establish general guidelines for the information security program, and of technical policies, 
which establish the security requirements that a product or a computer system should observe. In turn, 
Whitman et al. (2001) acknowledge the existence of three fundamental structures for policies: 
• Individual policy – In this structure, the organization creates a separate and independent security 
policy for each technology and system used. 
• Complete policy – In this structure, which is the most common according to the authors, the 
organization centrally defines, controls and manages one single document which includes all the 
technologies used and provides general guidelines to all the systems used by the organization. 
• Modular complete policy – This policy is centrally controlled and managed as in the case of the 
complete policy, and it consists of general sections, with descriptions of the technologies used, and 
discussions about the systems responsible and appropriate use. It differs from the previous 
 
structure because it includes modular appendixes, which provide specific details on each 
technology and bring forward particular observations, differences, restrictions, and functionalities 
related to the use of technology which are not properly covered in the base policy document. For 
Whitman et al. (2001), this is the most effective structure for information security policies. 
The medium in which the policy takes shape should be considered. It may be available printed or in 
electronic format, in which case it may be easier to change and disseminate by its recipients. 
Finally, one may ask what kind of documents the policies are. The consideration of the policies’ titles 
and the analysis of their components may help typifying the documents. 
2.2 Components of Information Security Policies 
The components of an information security policy are the set of elements that the policy document 
contains, i.e., its constituent parts. 
The attempt to generalize the elements that an ISP should include is hampered by the dependence that 
the composition of these documents presents on the nature of the organization, its size and goals 
(Dhillon 1999; Karyda et al. 2003). Although it is accepted that an ISP may vary considerably from 
organization to organization, this possibility has not prevented some authors from moving forward 
with guidance on the elements that policies should typically include. Thus, Wood (1995) claims that 
ISPs should include general statements of aims, goals, beliefs and responsibilities, frequently 
accompanied by general procedures for their achievement. 
Whitman (2004) argues that a good ISP should outline individual responsibilities, define which users 
are allowed to use the system, provide employees with an incident reporting mechanism, establish 
penalties for violations of the policy, and provide a policy updating mechanism. 
Given the importance of currently available normative references for the information security 
management activity, the ISO/IEC 27000 series of standards should be taken into account, namely 
ISO/IEC 27002, with respect to the components of an ISP. According to this international standard, 
the policy document should establish the management commitment to information security and 
contain the following statements (ISO/IEC 2005): 
• A definition of information security, its overall objectives, scope and the importance of security as 
an enabling mechanism for information sharing 
• A statement of management intent, supporting the goals and principles of information security 
aligned with the business strategy and objectives 
• A framework for setting control objectives and controls 
• A brief explanation of the security policies, principles, standards, and compliance requirements of 
particular importance to the organization (compliance with legislative, regulatory, and contractual 
requirements; security education, training, and awareness requirements; business continuity 
management; and consequences of information security policy violations) 
• A definition of general and specific responsibilities for information security management 
• References to documents which may support the policy, such as more detailed security policies 
and procedures for specific information systems or security rules users should comply with. 
By comparing several information security standards, Hone and Eloff (2002a) isolated the following 
elements as generic components that ISPs should include: 
• Need for and Scope of Information Security 
• Objectives of Information Security 
• Definition of Information Security 
• Management Commitment to Information Security 
• Approval of the Information Security Policy 
• Purpose or Objective of the Information Security Policy 
• Information Security Principles (risk management, compliance, access control, etc.) 
 
• Roles and Responsibilities 
• Information Security Policy Violations and Disciplinary Actions 
• Monitoring and Review 
• User Declaration and Acknowledgement 
• Cross References (to other information security documents) 
• General Elements (authors, date of policy and review date of policy) 
Among the studies reviewed, the components that collect more consensus are the purpose of the 
policy, its scope and the responsibilities it assigns to organizational agents. The purpose sets out the 
main objectives of the policy and the reasons that led to its formulation (Robiette 2001). The scope 
identifies the systems to which the policy applies, the employees to whom it is addressed and the 
situations in which it is relevant (Hare 2004). The responsibilities clarify the duties of managers, 
technicians and other employees with regard to information security (Kovacich 1998). 
3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The aim of the study is to characterize the content of ISP documents that have been adopted by 
organizations. Its motivation was the intention to supplement accumulated knowledge with work 
grounded in the analysis of information security empirical materials. 
Bearing in mind the goal of the work and how the literature review on the content of ISPs was 
organized, we seek to answer the following research question: What features and components do 
information security policy documents present in practice? 
Linking this question with the main contributions of the literature allowed us to instantiate the specific 
questions that guided the analysis in terms of policies’ features and components. Thus, with respect to 
the features of policies, we will address the following issues: 
• What is the length of the policy documents? 
• How are the policies written? 
• What is the expected durability of the policy documents? 
• What is the structure of the policies? 
• In what medium are the policies delivered? 
• What kind of documents are the policies? 
In what regards the policies’ components, we put forward the following specific questions: 
• What components do the policies contain? 
• Are there components that form part of all policy documents? 
• Are there components that are not present in any of the policy documents? 
• What is the purpose of the policies? 
• What is the scope of the policies? 
• What kinds of responsibilities do the policies determine? 
The analysis of the provisions contained in the policies may also allow understanding of whether the 
adopted policies configure documents of a more descriptive or of a more prescriptive nature. 
Specifically, the analysis of the responsibilities component may clarify whether the policy documents, 
in practice, regulate behavior through the establishment of prohibitions or permissions. 
The answer to these questions will enable to relate the features and components of the policies 
reviewed with the recommendations made in the literature with regard to the content that policy 
documents should display. This comparison will allow the assessment of the extent to which the 
documents adopted by organizations reflect the recommendations of the literature and, eventually, the 
identification of any discrepancies whose understanding may require further inquiry. 
 
4 RESEARCH STRATEGY 
Since this study aims to analyze ISP documents actually adopted by organizations, the first challenge 
to the design of this research was to obtain those documents. Given the intention of making a 
comparison between several policy documents, it was decided to restrict the collection of documents 
to a single organizational sector. With this option, we sought to minimize the possibility of documents 
belonging to different sectors having different features and components, due to particular 
characteristics of each of those sectors as well as specific information security needs. 
The sector selected for the collection of policies was the local government in Portugal. This sector was 
selected for two major reasons. First, being one of the main investors in IT (Gartner 2009), the 
government sector offers an interesting case for studying information security, and among the various 
Public Administration institutional agents, City Councils assume a specific relevance, as they 
concentrate a growing demand from their citizens for quality information services and for the diversity 
and quantity of data they deal with in the performance of their duties. Considering the information 
they manipulate, the security of their IS is indispensable to their normal functioning and to the 
protection of personal data which they are entrusted with. The second reason relates to previous 
research undertaken by the authors on local government information security. Having conducted a 
survey on ISPs adoption, we found that 38 (12%) of the 308 Portuguese City Councils said to have 
adopted ISPs and 270 (88%) have not adopted any policy yet (Lopes and de Sá-Soares 2010). 
For the present study, we contacted those 38 City Councils and asked them to provide us the ISP 
document. This interaction resulted in the collection of 25 documents, which are the basis for this 
study. The distribution of the documents collected is presented in Table 1 (the figure marked with an 
asterisk is explained by the fact that one City Council had formulated an ISP, but was awaiting formal 
approval for its adoption at the time the research team asked the policy documents to City Councils). 
 
Municipalities 
Categories 
Number 
of Voters 
Number of 
City Councils 
Number of City 
Councils with Policies 
Number of Policy 
Documents Collected 
Very Large More than 100.000 20 3 (15% of 20) 4* 
Large 50.000 to 100.000 21 6 (29% of 21) 4 
Medium Sized 10.000 to 50.000 150 20 (13% of 150) 13 
Small Up to 10.000 117 9 (8% of 117) 4 
Table 1. Distribution of Policy Documents Collected 
The characterization of the policy documents in terms of their features and components presented 
researchers with different challenges. While most of the policies’ features related questions could be 
answered by a “more impressionist way” (Babbie 1999, p. 71), such as the length, durability, structure 
and medium of the document, the questions regarding policies’ components demanded a systematic 
examination. In order to perform this examination, we applied the content analysis research technique. 
Content analysis uses a group of procedures to draw valid inferences from texts (Weber 1990). As 
stated by Berelson (1952, p. 74), content analysis is a “research technique for the objective, 
systematic, and quantitative description of manifest content of communications.” So that this 
description can be objective, it requires a precise definition of the analysis categories, in order to 
enable different researchers to use them and still get the same results. So that it is systematic, the 
whole relevant content must be analyzed in relation to all the meaningful categories. Finally, 
quantification allows the provision of more precise and objective information concerning the 
occurrence frequency of content features. 
The process of content analysis starts with the creation of a scheme of categories composed of the 
various analysis units. The more clearly formulated and well adapted to the problem and content under 
analysis the categories are, the more productive the studies using content analysis will be (Berelson 
 
1952). After the system of categories to use in the analysis has been established, it is possible to move 
on to the coding stage. 
From a procedural point of view, the analysis of ISPs proceeded as follows: 
1. Elaboration of the codebook – The second author elaborated a codebook to support the analysis of 
the documents. The codebook development followed the general guidelines provided by 
MacQueen et al. (1998). The codes were defined based on an extensive review of the literature on 
ISPs and of nine standards in the field of information security. Besides the code identifier, each 
code has associated the following fields of information: code name, brief description, full 
description, when to use the code, and when not to use the code. The codebook is composed of 51 
main codes. Some of these codes require the juxtaposition of subcodes, namely the targets of the 
policy as specified in its scope, specific responsibilities of the policy owner, entities to contact for 
specific purposes related to the policy, to whom a policy provision applies, the type of particular 
responsibilities and the information security object a particular provision of the policy refers to. 
2. Elaboration of coding instructions – The second author prepared a document with instructions to 
guide the coding stage. These instructions include preparatory work to undertake before starting 
coding and the sequence of steps that should be performed by the coder when processing each 
policy document, including what to do if questions arise during the coding process. 
3. Set up of coding team – A team of two coders was set up for analyzing the policies. One of the 
coders was the first author of this paper and the other coder was a third researcher. Both 
researchers were versed on information security. 
4. Preparation of the coding team – The coding team performed several preliminary tasks before 
starting the coding process of the 25 policies. After a thorough study of the codebook and coding 
instructions, a meeting was set up with coders and the author of the codebook and coding 
instructions to answer questions that the study might have raised. Since the coding process can be 
made easier and more systematic by using text processing tools, in this study the coders resorted to 
the qualitative data analysis software ATLAS.ti. Assisted by this program, the coders were trained 
using the codebook and coding instructions by coding four ISPs not pertaining to the 25 policies 
that form the basis of this study. A second meeting was held with the author of the codebook and 
coding instructions to jointly analyze the quality of the coding and to clarify any pending issues. 
Whenever the phrasing used in the codebook was considered ambiguous, the second author 
clarified it, producing a revised version of the codebook. 
5. Preparation of the documents – The first author prepared the documents to comply with the coding 
instructions and to allow the use of qualitative data analysis software. 
6. Coding process – Each coder individually coded the 25 ISPs. At the end of this process, the coders 
met to discuss specific dissimilarities in the output of the coding process and to make fine 
adjustments to some units of analysis in what concerns the degree of coding detail. 
The time spent on coding by the two coders was approximately 120 hours, which corresponds to an 
average of 2.4 hours per policy document per coder. 
5 RESULTS 
The length of the ISP documents analyzed ranges between a maximum of 26 pages and a minimum of 
one page. The average length is 8.8 pages, with standard deviation of 6.2 pages. For a 99% confidence 
interval, the population mean is in the range defined by 9 ± 2 pages. In terms of words, the documents 
range between a maximum of 5497 words and a minimum of 125 words, with an average length of 
2180 words and standard deviation of 1468 words. For a similar confidence interval, the population 
mean is in the range defined by 2180 ± 485 words. 
In the opinion of the coders, most of the policy documents are easy to read and to understand, properly 
structured and written in a clear, correct and intelligible language. Some of the documents that apply 
technical terms in the realm of information security provide a list of definitions for those terms. 
 
The majority of the documents do not allow any inference in what regards its durability. Of the 25 
documents, only one policy displays its default expected durability, by stating when the document 
should be reviewed. 
The analysis of the 25 ISPs provided by the City Councils suggests that these documents may be 
classified as organizational policies, following Lindup’s (1995) categorization. None of the collected 
documents configures a purely technical policy aimed to regulate the security behavior of a 
technological system or product. Still considering the structuring of the policies, and applying the 
categories suggested by Whitman et al. (2001), three policies (12%) are ‘individual policies’, 21 
(84%) fit the type ‘complete policy’ and one (4%) is a ‘complete modular policy’. 
All of the policy documents were provided in electronic version, except one that was sent printed by 
conventional mail. The examination of the policies showed that in five documents (20%), the policy 
determined what medium should be employed for its dissemination: three by electronic means 
(intranet and email) and two printed. 
Of the 25 policies, 23 (92%) have a clearly identifiable title. Nevertheless, the title of the documents 
varies considerably, though they may be grouped into the following categories: regulation (nine 
cases), norm (nine cases), manual of rules and procedures (two cases), job instructions (one case), rule 
(one case) and policy (one case). Despite this variety, most of the titles include a reference to IS or IT, 
such as information, IT equipment, email, internet, computers, and applications. It should be noted that 
although all the documents contain provisions regarding information security (most concerning 
acceptable use of IT and information, and in a reduced number of cases regarding information security 
management determinations), and five have the word ‘security’ in their title, none of the documents 
was labeled information security policy, although they are viewed as such documents by the City 
Councils concerned. 
With regard to the components comprised in the policies, there is considerable variation among the 
documents analyzed. Although several potential components were taken into account in this study, in 
Table 2 we present the most frequent components that were found in the policies. The list was sorted 
in descending order of frequency. 
The components that appear in more than half of the policies are responsibilities of individual or entity 
(the duties and obligations of organizational agents regarding information security), information 
security directives (decisions for the implementation of information security), requirements for 
information security (imperatives for the information security efforts undertaken by the organization), 
purpose of policy (why the policy was formulated), contacts (the name and means of contact of an 
individual or organizational unit), scope of policy (to whom the policy applies), penalties (the 
consequences for information security violations), and approval of policy (statement of management 
approving the policy). Of these components, only one is universal to the 25 documents, namely 
‘responsibilities’. 
In some documents, the purpose of the policy was stated as the reason for why the policy was 
formulated and in other documents to specify what the City Council wants to achieve with the policy. 
The incidences of the purpose are the IT resources (eight cases), internet and email (five cases), 
information (five cases), acceptable use of IT (three cases), and IT/IS resources optimization (two 
cases). Some of the documents specify purposes that fall in more than one of the previous categories. 
Of the 13 documents where the scope of the policy is specified, nine apply to individual organizational 
collaborators, seven to IT systems and three to organizational units (the sum is greater than 13 because 
six documents include more than one scope target). None of the documents identifies information on 
its scope specification. 
In what concerns responsibilities, the major types of responsibilities allocated to users or 
organizational units, i.e., those that appear in more than half of the documents, are listed in Table 3, 
alongside with the absolute and percent number of documents mentioning the type in question. 
 
 
Table 2. Components Contained in the Information Security Policies 
 
  Number 
of Policies 
Types of Responsibilities # % 
Responsibility for IS assets 
IS assets inventory; designation of owners of assets; establishment of rules for 
the acceptable use of IS assets 
20 80 
User responsibilities 
selection and use of passwords; protection of unattended equipment; clear desk 
policy for papers and removable storage media; clear screen policy for 
information processing facilities 
14 56 
Backup 15 60 
Operational procedures and responsibilities 
documentation, maintenance and availability of operating procedures; 
management of changes to information processing facilities and systems; 
segregation of duties; separation of development, test, and operational facilities 
15 60 
Operating system access control 
secure log-on procedures; user identification and authentication; password 
management systems; session timeout and limitation of connection time 
15 60 
Security of system files 
procedures to control the installation of software on operational systems; 
protection of system test data and access control to program source code 
15 60 
Protection against malicious and mobile code 13 52 
Table 3. Major Types of Responsibilities 
It should be stressed that the recommendations contained in the information security policies vary 
according to the type of user they refer to. There are provisions, such as operational procedures and 
responsibilities, whose targets are IT/IS technicians. The responsibility for maintaining, monitoring 
compliance, and reviewing the information security policy usually rests on a specific IT/IS unit (the 
IT/IS unit). Considering generic users (all those that manipulate information in the organization and 
that use IT equipment), the analysis of the documents revealed there are a set of responsibilities that 
can be said to be transversal to most of the documents, namely those regulating the use of email, 
internet use, IT equipment use, software protected by copyright and internal computer network use. 
Another view on the responsibilities is the nature of responsibility assigned to an agent. The coding 
results show that 207 of the total number of responsibilities contained in the policy documents are 
prohibitions (interdictions to perform certain information security related actions, phrased using terms 
such as ‘must not’ and ‘forbidden to’), 179 are obligations (bonds to perform certain information 
security related actions, phrased using terms such as ‘must’ or ‘has to’), 148 are duties (commitments 
to perform or not to perform certain information security related actions, phrased using terms such as 
‘should’ or ‘should not’), and 28 are recommendations (guidance to perform certain information 
security related actions, phrased using terms such as ‘may’ or ‘consider’). 
6 DISCUSSION 
The average length of the policies exceeds what is recommended by some authors as being the ideal 
length. Two documents are very brief (one page long), merely setting rules for internet and email use. 
Nine policies are lengthy (more than nine pages long) and include detailed provisions for a wide range 
of IT/IS and address different audiences (generic users, IT/IS technicians, organizational units). 
Typically, these documents consist of internal regulations, organized into chapters and articles. In 
these documents information security related provisions go along with other types of determinations, 
such as the IT/IS unit’s organization, competencies and responsibilities and the role IT plays in the 
organization. Therefore, several of the documents analyzed do not confine to ISPs, including other 
provisions associated to IT/IS, besides those related to information security. 
 
The analysis revealed that the main recipients of the documents are generic users of IT/IS and IT/IS 
technicians. Given the heterogeneity of generic users covered by the policies, the language used in the 
documents is clear and easy to read. Most of the longer documents target the two types of recipients. 
The coexistence of these two types of recipients in the same document may decrease its effectiveness 
since it puts together audiences with different responsibilities, knowledge, skills, and requirements in 
the context of IS security. Keeping apart generic users from IT/IS specialized users, by developing two 
separate documents, could increase the effectiveness of policies. Alternatively, City Councils could 
choose to structure their ISP documents as modular policies, where a root and general document is 
supplemented by modular appendixes which may be suited to different targets and situations. 
The type of the policy document appears to depend on the type and diversity of its recipients: 
whenever there is a wider access to IT/IS, this access is controlled by regulation, which will have to be 
approved by the Municipal Assembly in order to be effective by law; whenever the IT/IS are accessed 
only by and for the City Council employees, the control is established by norms, job instructions, 
policies, or rules. Whatever the case, the titles of the documents are aligned with the specific praxis 
and universe of discourse of public administration agencies. 
Most of the documents analyzed are fundamentally IT/IS acceptable use policies, focusing on the daily 
work routine of employees in what concerns the manipulation of information and IT. The priorities of 
this acceptable use are concentrated on the compliance with legal requirements (e.g., respect for 
copyrights, using IT resources only for business related activities and not participating in abusive or 
illicit use of IT/IS), secure information exchange (e.g., not opening suspicious email attachments, not 
downloading software from the internet and maintaining the antivirus application updated), definition 
of responsibilities for IS assets, and management of users’ access to IT/IS. It is also expected that the 
responsible use of IT/IS will lead to an optimization of IS/IT resources, including freeing the IT/IS 
unit from time consuming tasks resulting from user misuse of systems and applications. 
The option for printed documents seems to be justified by the need for users to sign a term of 
acknowledgement and responsibility concerning information security provisions. 
With regard to the components found in the ISPs, there is an oscillation in variety and frequency (cf. 
Table 2). Behind this finding may be the fact that City Councils differ in terms of information security 
management maturity levels. The intensity and complexity of their use of IT/IS may also play an 
important role in the degree of sophistication of their security policies. Whatever the case, the City 
Councils that have a complete ISP document in the light of the literature are few in number. This may 
result from a lack of clear and coherent ISP models which can be adopted by City Councils according 
to their own security needs (to date in Portugal there was no generic ISP document issued by a central 
governmental agency that City Councils had to adopt). Exploring the association between the length of 
policies and the number of components present, one finds Pearson r = 0.64 (for the length in pages) 
and r = 0.63 (for the length in words – calculating the association between the natural logarithm of the 
number of words and the number of components increases r to 0.68), both values for p < 0.001. The 
corresponding coefficient of determination amounts to 40%, suggesting that an increase in the length 
of policy is associated with an increase in the components present in the ISP document. To some 
extent this could be expected – longer documents may just contain more elements, but it raises 
questions regarding the size of ISP documents that is actually needed to accommodate the number of 
policy components suggested in the literature. 
Among the components, only ‘responsibilities’ form part of all documents, clearly denoting the 
behavioral guidance nature of ISPs. Yet, some of the components recommended by the literature as 
essential for an effective ISP are absent from all documents, such as the definition of information 
security, statement of the importance of information security for the organization, declaration of 
management commitment for information security, entity responsible for the policy, policy 
compliance monitoring, baseline security controls, and intended security level. 
In only one case there is a reference to the time scope in which the policy should be revised. This may 
result in a potential gap between the policies’ provisions and the risks that continuously appear along 
 
with the technological and business evolution. Other components, though not totally absent, are only 
found on a subset of the documents, such as who approved the policy document (when present, the 
approval is mainly obtained in the Council meeting), how security objectives serve business 
objectives, and the mechanism to report information security incidents. 
Bearing in mind the number of prohibitions and obligations that stand out in the policies, the 
documents show a clear tendency to a more imposing or imperative character of behavior adoption or 
abstention concerning IT/IS users and technicians. Although the policies reveal a high degree of 
behavior and conduct imposition or prescription, thus having an undeniably prescriptive character, if 
one considers the high level of detail enclosed in several policies, these documents also assume a 
descriptive character. The descriptive parts of the documents educate and inform readers on issues 
such as the importance of IT to City Councils’ missions, responsible use of IT, internal organization of 
the IT/IS unit, applicable legal requirements, and general security directives. 
7 CONCLUSION 
This study involved the characterization of 25 information security policies adopted by Portuguese 
City Councils in terms of components and features. This work contributes to the literature by 
analyzing information security empirical materials and bringing more practical and practitioner 
oriented perspectives to information security research. By focusing on the substance and form of 
actual ISPs, it elucidates an area of information security research that has been largely ignored, in spite 
of its practical relevance for the improvement of information security by organizations and 
supplements the literature whose traditional focus has been on individual intentions towards ISPs. 
Besides comparing the recommendations in literature concerning ISPs content with the practice 
performed by organizations, the paper laid groundwork for assessing the connection between ISP 
content and ISP compliance. The work also resorted to a less-utilized method in information security 
research, evidencing that content analysis is a well suited approach to examine ISP documents. 
This research work has some limitations, namely with regard to the number of documents collected. 
Although we believe that the 25 policies generated enough data to serve the purpose of the work, we 
also believe that a larger number might result in a richer and more sustained data set. Nevertheless, it 
should be noted that information security policies are generally considered reserved documents by 
organizations, which makes hard the access to this kind of security control. 
Another limitation of this paper regards the delimitation of the study to one organizational sector and 
to the national territory. This prevents conclusions concerning differences related to the missions as 
well as the functioning of other types of organizations as well as possible cultural differences 
regarding City Councils or other organizations in other countries or cultures. 
Among the possible works to be carried out in the future, we point out the proposal of an ISP template, 
so that it may be used as a potential model in an attempt to invert the reduced number of existing 
policies in the Portuguese City Councils. 
Another future work stemming from one of the limitations is to analyze ISP documents of 
organizations belonging to other sectors. This would enable the comparison of policy documents’ 
content in terms of features and components, for instance between public sector organizations and 
private organizations. 
Lastly, it would make sense to promote research focusing on the process of adopting ISPs by City 
Councils, namely in what relates to the formulation and implementation of policies. By studying how 
organizations develop their ISPs we may find out the reasons for these documents to present the 
features and components discussed in this paper. Similarly, by interviewing these organizations about 
ISP implementation we could be in a better position to relate ISP contents to ISP compliance by users, 
thus contributing to bridge the gap between information security theory and practice. 
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